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Article 1

The Transfiguration of Samuel Chase: A Rebuttal
Raoul Berger
Professor Stephen Presser's attempt to rehabilitate Justice
Samuel Chase and his portrayal of Thomas Jefferson as a
"demagogue" who had scant regard for the rule of law1 led me
t o dissent.' Since the appearance of my response, Presser has
published a book3 elaborating his thesis and, thereafter, a
. ~ valiant efforts are worthy of a better
reply to my d i ~ s e n tHis
cause. In a brilliant study, The Limitations of Science, the
mathematician-physicist J.W.N. Sullivan observed, "The
rigorous criticism, the complete lack of indulgence, that is
shown by the scientific world, is one of its most agreeable
characteristics. Its one simple but devastating criterion [is], 'Is
it true? . . . .'" To the extent that legal scholarship would
~c
that must be our criterion, even
approach s ~ i e n t integrity,
though, to quote Thomas Huxley, "[tlhe great tragedy of science
[is] the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.'%

1.
Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the
Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U.
L. REV. 106 (1989).
Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson: A Response to
2.
Stephen Presser, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 873.
'hI3 ENGLISH,THE
STEPHENB. PRESSER,THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING:
3.
AMERICANS,
AND THE DIALECTIC
OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE
(1991).
4.
Stephen B. Presser, Et tu Raoul? or The Original Misunderstanding
Misunderstood, 1991 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1475. I do not stand in the relation of Brutus
to Caesar. John Henry Newman wrote that "he loved . . . Truth better than dear
PRO V r r ~SUA110 (1989).
NEWMAN,
APOLOGIA
friends." J.H. CARDINAL
Lord Aman, former vice-chancellor of the University of London, observed that
"[p]ublication is all imperative: as a scholar you must expose yourself to criticism."
Noel h a n , Hint: It's More Than One Idea, N.Y. TIMES,May 24, 1992, § 9 (Book
Review), at 12.
5.
J.W.N. SULLIVAN,
THE LIMITATIONS
OF SCIENCE277-78 (1933). Andrei
Sakharov said, " 'Profound thoughts arise only in debate, with a possibility of
counterargument.' " William Safire, One Good Man, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1989, at
A19.
6.
THE OXFORDDICTIONARY
OF QUOTATIONS
266, para. 19 (2d ed. 1955).
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Writing of the "epidemic of Francophilia"' which swept the
country in the wake of the French Revolution, Presser notes
that Chase's fear that anarchy might spread to our shores may
in retrospect seem "fantastic and paradoid."' Viewed even in
his own times, it was not his function as a judge to halt the
tide.g Presser emphasizes that Chase sought to infuse his
profound religious convictions into the law.'' They did not,
however, deter him from cornering the Baltimore flour market
in 1778 on inside information that Congress was seeking flour
for the troops in New England." Hamilton branded him a s
" 'abandoned as any [public character] the history of past or
present times can produce.' "I2 More reprehensible was
Chase's conduct on the bench. But Presser thinks it "wrong of
Berger, and virtually every other American legal historian, to
dismiss Chase as simply a bigoted Federal bully,"13 an
"American Jeffreys,"14 who was "almost universally described
a s 'grossly partisan,' "I5 and, as Presser notes, became "the
hated symbol of parti~anship."'~
Are all historians out of step

7.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 75.
Id. a t 180.
8.
9.
Goebel observed that the hegemony of Parliament drastically shrank a
court's discretion "to indulge its own ideas of policy," a view that travelled to
GOEBELJR.,1 HISTORYOF THE SUPREMECOURTOF THE UNITED
America. JULIUS
STATES 228 (1971). James Wilson, for example, "anticipated no adventurous
pronouncements on policy by the bench." Id.
Judge Richard Peters, who sat with Chase, eschewed involvement in French
issues, considering that such issues "should be left to the executive branch."
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 60.
10.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1483-89; see infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
11. PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 25. Presser refers to Chase's "monstrously selfserving pecuniary adventures." Id. a t 181. The idea "that a judge who is corrupt
and debauched in private life may be pure and upright in his judgment," wrote
Thomas Cooley, is "false to human nature," and "a contradiction to general
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
experience." THOMAS
M. COOLEY,A TREATISE
POWERS
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATTVE
UNION440 (1868).
12.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting 1 THE PAPERSOF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON
580 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds. 1961)). Writing about
Chase's appointment to the Court, John Adams said, "his Character has a Mist
about it of suspicion and Impurity . . . . He has been a warm Party Man." Id. a t
HISTORYOF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
195 11.16 (quoting 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
UNITEDSTATES1789-1800, at 835 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985).
13.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1476.
14.
Id. a t 1478. Tradition "has made the name of 'Judge Jeffreys' a byword of
BRITANNICA
994 (14th ed. 1929).
infamy." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
15.
PRESSER,
supra note 3, at 2 1 (quoting JOHN
C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST
ERA 1789-1801, at 235 (1960)).
16.
Id. a t 27. His flaws, says Presser, were most "grievous." Id. a t 213 n.45.
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but Presser? In a similar context Justice Frankfurter rejected
the notion that the Court may say "everybody on the Court has
been wrong for 150 years."" Presser has therefore undertaken
a sisyphean task.

My critique of Chase's conduct in the Callender trial18 is
dismissed by Presser because the defense engaged in "a
calculated attempt . . . to embarrass Chase and the Adams
administrati~n."'~
Let that be assumed, and it does not justify
Chase's prejudicial conduct.20What counts is that Callender
was denied a fair trial in violation of due process, for a "fair
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due proces~.'~'
Chase constituted an unfair tribunal; in the words of Edward
Corwin, he came to the case with the "evident disposition to
play the 'hanging judge.' "22 Before demonstrating that Chase
had prejudged the case, let me brush in some background. ,

A. The Alien and Sedition Acts
Callender was charged with violation of the Sedition Act of
1798 for contemptuous utterances about President John Ada m ~ Presser
. ~ ~ notes that the Acts were "ill-conceivec and
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192-93 (1958) (concurring opinion).
17.
Berger, supra note 2, a t 879-82.
18.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1480-81.
19.
Even published strictures should not, Justice Holmes declared, prevent a
20.
judge from "performing his sworn duty", e.g., to be impartial. Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 424 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
21.
22.
Edward S. Corwin, Samuel Chase, in 4 DICTIONARYOF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY
36 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1930). This "he is still
commonly made out to be in the work of virtually all late twentieth century legal
and constitutional historians." PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 13. Charles Warren refers
to Chase's "prejudiced and passionate conduct of the trials of two Republicans,
Thomas Cooper and James T. Callender." 1 CHARLESWARREN,THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITEDSTATESHISTORY273 (1924).
23.
SAULK. PADOVER,
JEFFERSON
110 (Mentor abr. ed. 1952). Chase explained
that Callender's offense was "to assert that Adams, as a professed aristocrat, was
supra note 3, a t 135.
a n enemy to the republican government." PRESSER,
Jefferson too "was made the target of such abuse and defamation a s was never
before heaped upon any public figure in America. The Federalists portrayed him as
supra, a t 116.
a thief, a coward, a libertine, an infidel, and an atheist." PADOVER,
But his administration did not turn to the courts; "No matter how greatly the
newspapers abused their freedom, Jefferson felt, it was vital for democracy that
236-38
freedom not be checked." Id. a t 143. See also ALBERTJ. NOCK,JEFFERSON
(1926).

562

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

that "more and more [the Federalists] were perceived by the
American voting public as the party of brutish reaction and
pampered aristocra~y."~~
The "usual American scholars' opinion of these Acts and the period of their implementation is that
they reflected a 'reign of terror' " by the federalist^.'^ The antecedent English opposition thinkers "had correctly realized
that the English law of seditious libel was a profound impediment to the statement of their political views."26In his biography of Jefferson, Saul Padover considers that the "Federalists
were out t o destroy republicanism, Jeffer~onianism."~'Such
statements are dismissed by Presser as "opinions of mostly
twentieth century historians (who relied principally on Jeffersonian pr~paganda),"'~postulating that Samuel Eliot Morison,
Dumas Malone, and Justice Frankfurter had the wool pulled
over their eyes." Consider two Federalist appraisals free of
Jeffersonian virus: Marshall viewed the Sedition Act as
"useless and unwise";30 Hamilton "feared the effect of the repressive legislation. 'Let us not establish a tyranny.' "31
"For many years in America there had been a fear of judicial discretion," and provision for tenure "rekindled some of
those old fears about judicial arbitrarines~."~Federalists responded to this fear "by asserting that the judicial function . . .
would simply be one of lawfinding, and not law making."33
Where did the Constitution authorize judges "to restrain the

PRESSER, supra note 3, at 3.
Id. at 118. Presser rejects the "reign of terror" because the Federalists'
26.
"feeble effortsw-fines of a "few thousand dollars, and no more than a few months
in prisonw-hardly compares with the "same fear of treason [that] caused Hungarians t o put to death a man who translated the Marseillaise . . . into Magyar. Similarly, the governments of Austria, Rumania [sic], and Russia, during this period,
regularly meted out to dissidents sentences of death, sixty years in chains . . . ."
Id. at 119. But they fled to America in order to escape such enormities. "It could
have been worse" is a small extenuation.
Id. at 93.
26.
27.
PADOVER,
supra note 23, at 108.
28.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1480 (citing Berger, supra note 2, at 880). The
Federalist fear of democracy is exemplified by Gouverneur Morris's statement in
the Senate: " 'Why are we here? . . . To save the people from their greatest enemy; to save them from themselves.' " MERRILLD. PETERSON, THOMASJEFFERSON
AND THE NEWNATION
697 (1970).
29.
See i n h text accompanying notes 36-41.
30.
PADOVER,
supra note 23, at 109.
31.
Id.
32.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 29.
Id.
33.
24.

SAMUEL CHASE
dangerous majoritarian trends in some of the states"?34The
English Puritans, whose views travelled to America, feared the
"judges' imposition of their personal views."35
agitated for passage of
Chase, an "ardent Federali~t,"~~
the Act "and then threw himself into the forefront of Federalist
judges who pushed hard for enf~rcement,"~'thereby, wrote
Samuel Eliot Morison, "confound[ing] political opposition with
sedition.'"' The Federalist judiciary, Dumas Malone concluded, "amounted to an arm of that party,"3g and its object "was
the silencing of the opposition press."40 Thus, as Felix Frankfurter observed, "[tlhe judicial system was drawn into the vortex of politi~s."~'In his State Trials, Francis Wharton stated
34.
Id.
35.
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 891 (1985). The Tory Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts said that if "the Will of the Judge would be the Law . . . this tends to a
State of Slavery." Morton J. Horowitz, The Emergence of a n Instrumental ConcepIN AMERICANHISTORY287,
tion of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES
321 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
Alexander P. Humphrey, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 33 AM. L.
36.
REV. 827, 836 (1899). Presser notes "Chase's zealous campaigning for Adams."
PRESSER,supra note 3, at 161. And he finds Chase's campaigning "more perplexing
really than his conduct in the Fries, Cooper, and Callender trials." Id. at 141.
Judges, said Hamilton, were to be independent to guard against "those ill humors,
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures someFEDERALIST
NO. 78, a t 494
times disseminate among the people themselves."
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). Judges were not to stir u p
such "humors." I n the Federal Convention, James Wilson explained that judicial
independence was designed to remove judges from "every gust of faction." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERALCONVENTION
OF 1787, a t 429 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS].
Nor did Chase limit himself to the hustings. His "principal jeremiad" was his
now infamous charge to a Baltimore grand jury, criticizing the extension of suffrage. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 39. According to Presser, Chase engaged in dangerous moves to control Jeffersonian influence on popular institutions like the jury,
and to criticize universal suffrage, since it would lead to a dernogogically inspired
"mobocracy." Id. a t 149. Chase conceived that "it was the judiciary's job to restrain
democratic tendencies in the populace . . . ." Id. a t 148. See also CLAUDEG. BOWIN POWER273-74 (1936).
ERS, JEFFERSON
Presser explains that Chase was convinced that he could "apply a jurisprudence
which was above faction" because i t rested on "the one true constitutional faith."
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1483. The fact remains that he was the "most fanatical
Federalist on the bench." PETERSON,supra note 28, a t 635.
37.
OF THE UNITEDSTATESSUIrving Dilliard, Samuel Chase, in 1 JUSTICES
PREME COURT185, 194 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
38.
SAMUELE. MORISON,THE OXFORD HISTORYOF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 353
(1965).
39.
AND HIS TIMES458 (1970).
4 DUMASMALONE,JEFFERSON
40.
Id. at 466.
41.
& JAMES
M. LANDIS,THE BUSINESSOF THE SUPREME
FELIX FRANKFWRTER

=
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that the Sedition Act "was pressed by Judge Chase with inquis~~
itorial energy, and executed with intolerant ~ i g o u r . "Understandably the Jeffersonians "came to regard the courts as a
political adjunct of the hated federalist^.'"^ It did not require
misrepresentation by defense counsel to 'excite public indignation against the court and the go~ernment.'"~Presser recognizes that the Federalists were swept from office in 1800 because of their "zealous prosecution of seditious libel and the
other blatant examples of transplanted English. . . jurisprudence employed by. . . Chase in the Fries and Callender case ~ . ' "Although
~
the Act was not directly tested in the Supreme
Court, it declared in 1964 that "the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of hi~tory.'"~
B. The Trial
Now for the facts that prove the gross partiality of the
"hanging judge." Luther Martin, Chase's chief counsel in the
subsequent impeachment proceedings, testified therein that he
had obtained Callender's book; underscored "a great portion of
the book"; thought it "ought to be prosecuted"; and, learning
that Chase was to sit on circuit in Richmond, gave it to him?
A respected lawyer, John Mason, testified that Chase told him
that if Virginia would "furnish a jury of good and respectable
men, he would certainly punish Callender," and thereby teach
the people "to distinguish between liberty and licentiousness of
the press.'"' Chase admitted that "the atrocious and profligate
libel" had "excited" his "indignation," and that he feared lest an
"atrocious offender" would escape p ~ n i s h r n e n t .To
~ ~ James

COURT21 (1927).
42.
RANCI CIS WHARTON,STATETRIALSOF THE UNITEDSTATES45 (1849).
4 MALONE,supra note 39, a t 21.
43.
44.
THE
Presser, supra note 4, at 1481 11.22 (citing 3 ALBERTJ. BEVERIDGE,
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL203 (1919) (quoting Luther Martin's argument a t the
Chase impeachment trial)). Albert Beveridge, no Jeffersonian, wrote that the "manners and methods [of the nationalist judges] in the enforcement of the Sedition Act
aroused against them a n ever increasing hostility. . . . Finally the very name and
sight of National judges became obnoxious to most Americans. In short, the assaults upon the National Judiciary were made possible chiefly by the conduct of
supra, at 29-30.
the National judges themselves." 3 BEVERIDGE,
45.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 94.
46.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
47.
14 ANNAIS OF CONG.24546 (1852). PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 232 n.9.
48.
14 ANNAB OF CONG.216-17 (1852).
Id. at 135-36.
49.
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Triplett, he remarked, "it is a pity you have not hanged the
rascal."50 Can it be doubted that Chase had prejudged the
case and was not an impartial judge? Presser answers that
"our contemporary ideas about judicial objectivity cannot serve
as useful standards for evaluating the jurisprudence of the late
eighteenth century."51 Hamilton, who reflected "late eighteenth century" standards, declared, "[wlho would be willing t o
stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting
under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his
guilt?"' Blackstone stated that the "tyrannical partiality of
judges" was a "crime of deep malignity."53
Throughout the trial Chase exhibited his partiality. Albert
Beveridge, not infected with Jeffersonianism, noted the "sarcastic contempt" with which Chase treated defense counsel and
noted that Chase's frequent interruptions were "extremely well
calculated to abash and disconcert counsel."54 Marshall, an
attendant at the trial, later testified that Chase plainly exhibited "disgust" with the way counsel was conducting the defense.s5 Presser himself notices Chase's "extraordinary condescension" to defense counsel "and his pointed humor at their
-expense,"56the more damaging because, as Chase frequently
stressed, they were only "young gentlemen."57In his impeachment trial, Chase acknowledged that "vexatious interruptions
of counsel'' and "manifestations of 'indecent solicitude' for the
conviction of a most notorious offender" are "no doubt improper

50.
Id. at 217-18.
51.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 174. But Presser does not shrink, after
Jefferson's alleged "approval of extra-legal means of apprehending Burr," to presume that Jefferson was "pronouncing his guilt before benefit of trial." Presser,
supra note 4, a t 1491; see infia note 95.
52.
THE FEDERALIST
NO. 65, a t 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright
ed., 1961). THOMASHOBBES,LEVIATHAN80 (Everyman's Library 1943) (1651) ("[Ilf
a man be trusted to judge, between man and man, it is a precept of the law of
nature, that he deal equally between them.").
53.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWSOF ENGLAND140
(1769).
supra note 44, a t 190.
54.
3 BEVERIDGE,
55.
14 ANNALSOF CONG.537 (1852).
56.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 134. Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that there
is an "obligation upon the judge to refrain from ridiculing or making light of the
lawyers." WILLIAMH. REHNQUIST,GRANDINQUESTS84 (1992).
57.
When "young gentlemen" comes from the mouth of a Justice three times in
as many minutes, WHARTON,supra note 42, at 8, it is manifestly belittling, designed to suggest to the jury that defendant's counsel are still immature, in judgment as well as in years.
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and unbecoming in a judge" but were not defined as a crime.58
Even so, they deprived Callender of the impartial trial guaranteed by due process.
Such behavior was designed to prejudice the jury, who
identify defense counsel with the defendant. At length, defense
counsel threw up their briefs. For Presser, this was merely part
of their campaign t o discredit Chase and Adamd9 But Henry
Adams, scarcely influenced by "Jeffersonian propaganda," said
in his History of the United States that Chase's "overbearing
manner had twice driven from his court the most eminent
counsel of the ~ircuit."~'Against this, Presser quotes Albert
Beveridge's quotation of Luther Martin's statement at the
Chase impeachment trial that Callender's lawyers sought " 'to
hold up the prosecution as oppressive' in order to 'excite public
indignation against the court.' "'l A statement by a lawyer for
a client condemning the conduct of opposing counsel gains
nothing by being quoted by Albert Beveridge. Indeed, why
should evaluations by disinterested scholars like Frankf'ter
and Morison be kissed off as tinctured by "Jeffersonian propaganda" whilst the testimony of Chase's attorney is regarded as
gospel truth? Martin's statement needs t o be juxtaposed with
his later remarks. In 1810, he appeared before Chase on circuit
in Baltimore, somewhat more inebriated than usual. When
Chase said to him, "I am surprised that you can so prostitute
your talents," Martin replied, "Sir, I never prostituted my talents except when I defended you and Colonel Burr," and turning to the jury, he added codidentially, "a couple of the greatest rascals in the
In vino veritas.
Merrill Peterson concluded that the Callender trial was a
"travesty of justice."63 Nevertheless, Presser maintains that
because of the "machinations of Callender's defense counsel,"

58.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 157.
Id. at 134.
59.
2 HENRYADAMS,HISTORYOF THE UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
147-48
60.
(1962).
61.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1481 11.22. Martin was Chase's chief counsel in
the impeachment hearings. See supra text accompanying note 47.
62.
PAULS. CLARKSON & R. SAMUELJ m , LUTHERMARTIN OF MARYLAND
280
(1970).
63.
supra note 28, at 635. Claude Bowers wrote, "No one with an
PETERSON,
elementary sense of common decency can read in Wharton's 'State Trials' the outrageous miscarriages of justice with feelings other than those of loathing and disgust." BOWERS,
supra note 36, at 269.

SAMIJEL CHASE
the "trial itself was stacked against Cha~e,'"~
a man, Presser
notes, still commonly regarded as a "'rabid partisan', a courtroom bully who wrongfully used the bench as a 'political
stump."'65 This, Presser considers, is the view of "those who
ought t o know better,"66 preferring the "more astute historians" who regard Chase as "conciliatory," and "di~interested."~~
Measured by the record, such "astuteness" is laughable.

C. Adjudication and Re1&ion
That Chase was hag-ridden by his drive to enforce the
Sedition Act is hardly deniable. To my statement that Chase's
'religiously inspired' convictions did nbt excuse his judicial
Presser retorts that
partisanship. So was the Inq~isition,"~~
this is "dubious history, and maybe even dubious manner^.'"^
Since when is a statement of an undeniable fact-the Inquisition also was religiously inspired-a breach of scholarly manners? Certainly it is not "dubious history." The Inquisition
punished heretics, those who departed from Catholic orthodoxy.?' Presser's defense of Chase nicely f i t s into this pattern:
"Chase's religion, and the moral basis for his jurisprudence
which religion furnished him, convinced him . . . that [he] could
apply a jurisprudence which was above faction . . . the one true
constitutional faith."71 People were burned at the stake for
departures from the "one true faith"-Galileo was forced to
recant his view that the earth revolved around the sun for
precisely such a departure. Presser explains Chase's passionate
enforcement of the Sedition Act, but he fails t o absolve him
from prejudicial partiality. It is of no avail that Chase could
"convince himself that he was not a partisan."72How could he
be if there was but one true faith and if those who differed
Chase confused
were guilty of "partisan, popular ex~esses"?'~
his own prejudices with Holy Writ, and this at a time when
"

PRESSER,supra note 3, at 133 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8. Presser acknowledges that Chase had some "tragic," "grievous"
Id. at 234 11.45.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 19.
Berger, supra note 2, at 885.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1483.
BRITANNICA
377 (14th ed. 1929).
70. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
71.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1483.
Id. at 1484.
72.
73.
Id.

64.
65.
flaws.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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American opinion was moving towards the conception that "it
was the job of the law to liberate the individual from the moral
~ ~alone from those of a n overdictates of the ~ o m m u n i t y , "let
bearing judge.
11. THE TRIALOF JOHN FRIES

A. Fries' Rebellion in Eastern Pennsylvania
John Fries, himself a Federalist,?' was prosecuted for
treason and sentenced to death for leading an armed "rebellion"
i n Pennsylvania. Presser dismisses my criticism because it
relies on "a general secondary source, which utterly distorts the
facts of the Eastern Pennsylvania rebellion . . . and which undoubtedly relies on spurious Jeffersonian account^."?^ This
impressionable "secondary source," Samuel Eliot Morison,
wrote that when federal assessors arrived in Bucks County to
survey real estate for a direct tax, "they were attacked by irate
housewives with broomsticks and boiling water, a n d . . . Fries
put himself a t the head of the rabble which drummed the official out of the county."77
Initially, Presser was very much of the same mind: "The
insurgency involved much display of armed might by the insurgents, much marching around and saber-rattling, and an armed
attack on a federal marshal that resulted in the forced liberation of some federal prisoners whom the marshal had in his
custody."78 He notes that "[ilt seems to be the currently accepted wisdom of American historians that Federalist conduct
in suppressing [the rebellion] did go too f a r . . . . The Fries
rebellion is habitually dismissed by modern American histori-

74.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 175-76.
PETERSON,
supra note 28, at 622.
75.
76.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1481. The evidence, states Presser, "appears to
have all but disappeared." PRESSER,supra note 3, at 31. Therefore he relies on
long-hand annotations on newspaper clippings written in 1860 by Jacob Rice, from
which Presser deduces that "Rice appears to have some firsthand knowledge of the
Fries Rebellion." Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Since the rebellion took place in 1799,
Rice must have been a nine-year-old observer, scarcely the sort of "firsthand"
knowledge to explode the "accepted wisdom of American historians." They too had
access to the newspaper clippings. See also id. a t 226 n.20.
77.
MORISON,supra note 38, a t 355.
Presser, supra note 1, a t 131. Jefferson wrote to Abigail Adams, "I like a
78.
little rebellion now and then . . . . The spirit of resistance to government is so
valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive." NOCK, supra
note 23, a t 116.
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ans as a minor incident."?' Now Presser takes a grimmer
view: "The rebellion was a serious uprising of thousands of
armed insurgents bent on taking the law into their own
hands.'"' "Although there was no real bloodshed," he observes,
"there was . . . much marching around by armed troops in uniform and at least one overt act of rebellion-the liberation of
prisoners from the custody of a federal marshal by means of
armed militia? Did this amount to "treason" or 'levying
war" against the United States?
Apparently Presser relies on the English rule, adopted by
the Court in the Whiskey Rebellion case, of ''constructive levying of war" by "armed opposition to execution of a United
States statute."82But Article 111, Section 3 of the Constitution
declares that "[tlreason against the United States shall consist
only in levying war against them."83"Only" was not inadvertent. Aware, in the words of James Wilson, that "numerous and
dangerous excrescences" had disfigured the English law of
treason, the Framers delimited treason and thereby, as Wilson
assured the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, put it beyond the power of Congress to "extend the crime and punishment of treason."84"Only" levying war was treasonable; "constructive" levying of war constituted the very "extension" of the
crime that the Framers plainly meant to prevent?

B. The Aaron Burr Conspiracy
Presser's treatment of Fries is in marked contrast to his
indulgent portrayal of the Aaron Burr conspiracy. Burr set
afoot an extensive, planned conspiracy, into which he sought t o
draw England and Spain and t o "make Louisiana an independent republic, which Mississippi Territory would surely decide

79.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 31.
80.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1481. But see REHNQUIST,supra note 56, at 48
("Fries's Rebellion does not seem to have been a great threat to the nation . . . .
No shots were fwed, there were no injuries, and the crowd soon dispersed.").
81.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 104.
Id. a t 102 (emphasis added).
82.
83.
U.S. CONST.art. 111, $ 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
WILSON663 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). See
84.
2 THE WORKSOF JAMES
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
also 2 DERATESIN THE SEVERALSTATECONVENTIONS
FEDERAL
CONSTITZJTION
469 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
85.
Blackstone adverts to the "great latitude left in the breast of the judges, to
determine what was treason, or not so: whereby the creatures of t y r a ~ i c a lprinces
had opportunity to create abundance of constructive treasons." 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 53, at 75.
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to join."86 Burr and Blennerhasset, "commanding a n advance
guard [ofl . . . flatboats, had reached the mouth of the
Cumberland River" when co-conspirator General Wilkinson
betrayed Burr's conspiracy "to dismember the Union."" Burr
was acquitted by Marshall on the ground that "the mere gathering of forces with intent to promote secession was not treason
Certainly, the threat by Fries'
if the expedition collap~ed."~~
"rabble" was less ominous than the planned gathering of Burr's
forces. Morison concluded that Burr was engaged in "the most
formidable secession conspiracy prior to 1860."89 Against
Morison, a renowned historian, Presser counters with the view
of a novelist, Gore Vidal, that Burr was "railroaded" by the
Jeffersonian~.~~
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "railroaded" a s "to
rush (a person or thing) to or into a place, through a proPeterson remarks on Jefferson's "first hesitant steps to
ce~s."~'
cope with the conspiracy, a conspiracy so strangely public by
then that men wondered at the timidity of the g o ~ e r n m e n t . " ~ ~
Henry Adams "bitterly . . . arraign[ed] Jefferson for inexcusable
lassitude and indifference in failing to strike months before he
did."93 When Jefferson did act, "[ilt was wrung from him by a
resolution in the House, pressed by his most virulent enemy,
John R a n d ~ l p h All
. ~ ~of which is incompatible with "railroadi~~g.'"~

86.
MORISON,
supra note 38, at 369.
Id. a t 370. For detailed accounts of the Burr conspiracy, see BOWERS,
supra
87.
note 36, a t 366-426; PETERSON,
supra note 28, at 841-54.
MORISON,
supra note 38, at 370. But Marshall, who presided, also stated
88.
that "the evidence was sufficient to hold Burr to answer on a charge of organizing
supra note 56, at 118.
an expedition against Spainn-a misdemeanor. REHNQUIST,
So here was a criminal conspiracy. Compare infia text accompanying note 96.
MORISON,
supra note 38, at 370.
89.
90.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1491 11.84.
91.
DICTIONARY
114 (1969).
8 OXFORD ENGLISH
92.
PETERSON,supra note 28, at 847.
93.
BOWERS,supra note 36, at 398.
Id.
94.
95.
Presser disposes of the Burr conspiracy-"if there was one," see infia text
accompanying note 96, by reference to Jefferson's alleged "approval of extra-legal
means of apprehending Burr (and, presumably pronouncing his guilt before benefit
of trial)." Presser, supra note 4, at 1491. Apprehension of one who twice had fled
supra note 28, at 853, does not amount to a prothe jurisdiction, see PETERSON,
nouncement of guilt. Presser cites to Berger, supra note 2, at 896-98, which merely
quotes his own statement that Jefferson excused his "failure to observe the niceties
of federal law in prosecuting his arch-enemy Aaron Burr." My article then proceeds
to refute Presser's construction of Jefferson's action. One who read's Peterson's
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"We now know," P r e s s e r a s s e r t s , " t h a t Burr's
conspiracy-if there was one-was not the danger Jefferson
claimed it was."96 But it bore a quite different aspect to contemporaries. After investigating the participation of Senator
John Smith of Ohio, a Senate Committee, chaired by Senator
John Quincy Adams, "warmly commended the administration
for suppressing the conspiracy that would, 'in a very short
lapse of time, have terminated not only in war, but in a war of
the most horrible des~ription.'"~'Justly did the Committee
obliquely attribute the acquittal to the "curtain of artificial
rules" invoked by MarshalLg8 The high-minded Adams was
not one to lend himself to a white-wash of Jefferson. Whatever
the merits, Marshall's strict construction of applicable standardssg is at a long remove from Chase's easy invocation of
treason in the Fries case. "Sabre-rattling" was not likely to
result in "a war of the most horrible description."

C. The Trial of John Fries
To recur to the Fries trial, Presser has yet other objections
to my critique of Chase's conduct. In the first trial before Judge
Richard Peters, Fries' renowned lawyers, Alexander Dallas and
William Lewis, were permitted to argue a t length that treason
under American law differed from that of England.loOWhen
Peters declared a mistrial because one juror had prejudged the
case,lO' it was retried before Chase, who barred such argument.lo2 Presser considers that this was "clearly good law in

extensive account of the conspiracy will appreciate Jefferson's forbearance in dealing with a deep-dyed villain. PETERSON,supra note 28, a t 841-54.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1491 (emphasis added).
96.
PETERSON,supra note 28, at 873.
97.
98.
Id.
99.
Corwin, who was "antipathetic to Jefferson, and generally sympathetic toward Marshall, has concluded that 'Marshall's conduct of Burr's trial is the one
serious blemish on his judicial record.' " BOWERS,supra note 36, a t 423 (quoting 3
EDWARDS. CORWIN,JOHN
MARSHALLAND THE CONSTITUTION
2 (1919)). Marshall, it
is to be borne in mind, was a bitter enemy of Jefferson. 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN
ADAMS 1064 (1962).
100. Presser, supra note 1, a t 131.
101. Id.
102. Presser, supra note 4, at 1482. Chase had drafted an opinion on the applicable law before trial, which was concededly unprecedented, and which he delivered
to defense counsel, who then withdrew from the case "since the court had prejudged what they wished to argue." PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 110. Presser considers that their "real motive" was to present Chase as "a harsh and cruel judge" in
order to create "sympathy for Fries." Id. at 112. Julius Goebel was closer to the
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England, and probably in America a s well."'" "Clearly" it
was not. During the debates on passage of Fox's Libel Bill in
1791, Lord Loughborough, who had served as Chief Justice of
Common Pleas, said that the "bill was a declaratory bill . . . to
declare and explain what was understood to be . . . the law of
the land."lM Presser maintains, however, that the Fox Act
pertains only to seditious libel;'" but Charles James Fox
stated in course of the enactment debate that "it was the practice of the jury to judge of law and factyywith respect to "every
other criminal indi~trnent."'~~
Nevertheless, Presser insists
that the Fox Act required the "deferential jury [to] make its
determination under the direction of the court."107How is this
to be reconciled with Chase's understanding that "in criminal
cases nothing could prevent the jury from applying whatever
law it saw fity'?'" Lord Loughborough stated that "as Chief
Justice he had ever deemed it his duty, in cases of libel, to
state the law as it bore on the facts, and to refer the combined
considerations to the jury," whose "decision was final."log So
too, Lord Camden, likewise a former Chief Justice of Common
Pleas, said that "[tlhe judge should interpose nothing but his
advice; if he attempted to control them, there was a n end to
trial by j ~ r y . " " ~Earlier, Blackstone obsemed, "If the judge's
opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be useless.""' Manifestly, Presser's reading of the Fox Libel Act as
"preserving the essential premise that the jury was obligated to

mark in viewing the withdrawal "to maintain the honor of the bar." Id. Eminent
counsel would not gamble with the life of a man accused of treason in order to
arouse popular sympathy. See also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
103.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1482.
104.
29 PmL. HIST. ENG. 731 (1817). Lord Camden said the purpose of the bill
was not to 'alter the law, but merely to remove doubts that ought never to have
been entertained." Id. at 732. For a more detailed discussion, see Raoul Berger,
The Jury's Role in Capital Cases Is Immune from Judicial Interference, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 639.
105.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1487.
106.
29 PARL.HIST. ENG. 564, 597 (1817).
107.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 93.
108.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1488.
109.
29 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1296-97 (1817).
110.
Id. a t 731. In 1771, John Adams asked, '[Ils it not an absurdity to suppose
that the law would oblige them to find a verdict according to the direction of the
court, against their own opinion, judgment and conscience?" 2 THE WORKSOF JOHN
ADAMS253-55 (Charles F. Adams comp., 1855).
111. PRESSER, supm note 3, a t 209 11.15 (quoting 4 BLACRSTONE,
supra note 53,
a t 343, 354-55).
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follow the law as laid down by the judge"'" is at war with
the drafters' explanation.
Some references to similar early American practice are
cited in my earlier
In the colonial scheme, Shannon
Stirnson recently wrote that ''juries held the central place in
colonial courts"; colonials considered that " 'juries rather than
judges spoke the last word on law enforcement.' "'I4 William
Nelson observed that the jury's power "to 'find law' was almost
~nlimited."''~Presser himself refers to "the truism that the
American jury was to be the judge of both fact and law."l16
Indeed, this was the view of Chase; in his pre-trial opinion, he
stated, "It is the duty of the court in this, and in all criminal
cases, t o state to the jury, their opinion of the law arising on all
the facts; but the jury are to decide . . . both the law and the
facts . . . ."'17
So pronounced was this attachment to jury finality as to both law and fact that, as Presser observes, Federalist attempts "to curtail the discretion of the criminal jury"
were "a major cause of the fall from political grace of the Federalists."'" Albeit, Fries posed an issue of "constitutional
law"-at a time when the very conception of "constitutional
law" was aborning-it was "law" nonetheless, and defense
counsel could logically claim under accepted tenets that the
jury had a right to pass on it. Indeed, Presser notes that in Van
Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, lg Justice "Paterson was apparently prepared to give the jury this power even where great
constitutionally protected rights were a t stake and where it
was the duty of the court to 'adhere to the Constitution and
declare [a statute] null and void.' "I2'
The foregoing facts run counter to Presser's contention that
jury ascendancy violated the rule of law-the requisites of
112. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 53.
113. See Berger, supra note 104, at 641-42.
C. STIMSON,
THE ERICAN AN REVOLUTION
IN THE LAW 48 (1990)
114.
SHANNON
(quoting William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH.L. REV. 893, 904 (1978)). Americans believed that "the expansive participation by the jury in legal decisions was an
essential safeguard to the liberty of the people. This required that the jury be
supra
given the latitude to pass on questions both of 'law' and 'fad.' " PRESSER,
note 3, at 17.
supra note 114, at 49.
'
115.
STIMSON,
116. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 111.
117. REHNQUIST,
supra note 56, at 67.
118. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 67.
119.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
120. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 65.
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certainty. Doubtless certainty is a desideratum; but we may not
impute to Camden, Loughborough, and Kent ignorance of the
varying nature of jury verdicts. Rather, preservation of jury
control as a bulwark against oppression loomed larger than
absolute fealty to certainty. Then too, the rule of law was satisfied by the settled "law"-that
expressed by Lords Camden,
Loughborough, and by Charles James Fox-which gave juries
the final word. As Presser repeatedly reminds us, we may not
substitute present views for those that prevailed a t the time of
the Fries trial. 12'
Presser urges that 'Tries's [wily] counsel, seeing political
capital to be made and believing that they could maneuver for
a pardon of Fries, refused to go on with the trial."lP "Astonishingly," states Presszr, "Berger appears to have accepted
uncritically the Jeffersonian fabrication that Chase drove
~ his History of the United
Fries's counsel from the ~ a s e . " ' In
States, Henry Adams, who cannot be charged with "uncritical"
acceptance of "Jeffersonian fabrications,"' wrote that Chase's
"overbearing manner had twice driven from his court the most
eminent counsel of the ~ i r c u i t . " ' ~
Presser dwells on Chase's "extraordinary gesture" of offering "to act both as counsel f3r the defense and as judge[],"
though he notes that "Chase was doing no more than 'following
common law tradition."'l* But he notes that "Chase did not
abandon his protection of the prosecution's interests2'-in the
presence of the p r o s e c ~ t o r . 'When
~~
the prosecutor "declined
to sum up the evidence against Fries" because "Fries had no

121.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
122.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1482. "Wily [and eminent] counsel" would not
gamble with the life of a client in the hope that the Federalist President would
pardon him.
Id.
123.
124.
2 ADAMS,supra note 60, a t 147-48. See also supra text accompanying note
60. Rehnquist, however, mnsiders, "There is good reason to think . . . that Fries's
attorneys withdrew at least in part to increase the chances of a presidential pardon for him if he were convicted." REHNQUIST,supra note 56, at 89. Julius Goebel
came to a contrary conclusion. See supm note 102. Rehnquist notes that William
Lewis, counsel for Fries, "was a fierce guardian of the independence of the bar,
and of the fullest right of defense on behalf of a n accused criminal, so it is understandable that he was deeply offended by Chase's manner of proceeding at the
supra note 56, a t 62. Lewis said, "I will never permit my
Fries trial." REHNQUIST,
hand to be tainted with a prejudged opinion i n any case, much less in a capital
one." Id. a t 63.
125.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 112-13.
126. Id. a t 113.
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counsel t o give a countersummary, Chase announced that fairness to the government required a summing up," and unless
the prosecutor did so, "then he, Chase, would."1z7This is but
one of many illustrations of Chase's allying himself with the
prosecution, indeed of pressing beyond the prosecutor's express
desire.
Chase sentenced Fries to death, and President Adams
pardoned him. According t o Presser, the pardon was procured
by Fries's counsel "from the popularity-seeking ad am^."'^^ My
interpretation, he opines, "seems to stretch the facts."129The
facts are that Thomas Adams, son of the President, told William Lewis that "his father wished to know the points and
authorities which Mr. Dallas and he [had] intended t o rely on,
in favour of Fries, if they had defended him on the trial."lsO
John Adams, himself a respected lawyer, had written in 1771
that the jury "determine[d] both the fact and the law . . . . [Ils
it not an absurdity t o suppose that the law would oblige them
to find a verdict according to the direction of the court, against
Dallas's attheir own opinions, judgment and cons~ience."~~'
tempt to argue the point of lawls2 inferably struck a sympathetic chord in Adams. The dour President was hardly a "popularity seeker." In truth, he despised "a mean itch for popularity? That he acted on the promptings of his own conscience
is attested by the fact that almost a decade later he recalled
the Fries pardon "with infinite satisfaction . . . which will console me in my last hour."lS4Such testimony transcends speculation that Adams was motivated by a drive to win reelection.

Presser maintains that Chase was acquitted because "the
impeachment charges had no real substance," and he chides me
for neglecting t o address his argument that "Chase's rulings
violated no law."ls5 Compared to Chase's gross partiality, the

127.
Id.
128.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1482.
129.
Id. at 1482-83.
supra note 42, at 645.
WHARTON,
130.
131.
2 ADAMS,supra note 60, at 253-55.
132.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
133.
supra note 28, at 703.
PETERSON,
supra note 42, at 646. "Adams, to his great credit . . . pardoned
WHARTON,
134.
Fries." REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 49.
135.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1489 (emphasis added). Charles Warren remarked
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"rulings" were trivial, so I focused on the charge made in article 4, paragraph 5 of the Articles of Impeachment that Chase's
conduct was marked by "an indecent solicitude . . . for the conviction of the accused . . . highly disgraceful to the character of
a judge, as it was subversive of justice."136 Blackstone, it will
be recalled, stated that the "tyrannical partiality of judges" was
Chase's blatant partiality not
a "crime of deep rnalig~~ity."'~'
only deprived Callender of the fair trial promised by the Due
Process Clause, but it also violated a statute. By the Judiciary
Act of 1789, a Justice was sworn to "administer justice without
respect to persons" and "impartially discharge and perform all
the duties incumbent upon him."ls8 Thus, Chase's incontrovertible partiality violated the statute, and his denial of due
process subverted the Constitution. Blackstone wrote that "the
first and principal [high misdemeanor] is the mal-administration of such high officers, as are in the public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment . . . ."lSg English judges, Justice Story
observed, had been impeached "for acting grossly contrary to
the duties of their office."140Elsewhere, I have collected examples of such impeachable offenses.141
Presser has neglected to comment on these facts; his conclusion that Berger "is still wrong" in arguing that "Chase
should have been convicted,'"" rests on the alleged propriety
of Chase's "rulings" during the trial. Presser's view is espoused
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his recent Grand inquest^.'^^
He considers that even if Chase's rulings during the Callender

on Chase's "arbitrary and unusual rulings" in the Fries case. 1 WARREN,supra
note 22, a t 273.
136.
14 ANNALSOF CONG.86 (1852). Marshall, who testified in the impeachment
trial, "admitted that the refusal to hear Callender's lawyers on the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act was unusual. He admitted he had never known another instance where, as in the case of John Taylor, the question to be asked the witness
had to be reduced to writing." BOWERS,supra note 36, at 285. Whether or not
such rulings violated the law, they undoubtedly exhibited bias. For a compact account of the impeachment trial see id. at 277-91.
137.
supra note 53; see also supra text accompanying note 53.
4 BLACKSTONE,
138. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, $ 8, 1 Stat. 76 (1789).
139.
supra note 53, a t 121.
4 BLACKSTONE,
140.
1 JOSEPH
STORY,COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES$ 800 (5th ed. 1905).
141.
See RAOULBERGER, IMPEACHMENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS
67-68
(1973).
142.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1489.
143.
supra note 56.
REHNQUIST,
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trial were erroneous, they were not, roughly speaking, unlawf ~ 1 . But
l ~ ~when they all run one way, against the defendant,
when they are "arbitrary,"'45 "highly unusual,"'46 and "extraordinary,"'" they are evidence of bias. By the Judiciary
Act of 1789, a Justice was t o be sworn to "impartially discharge
all the duties incumbent upon [him]."'" Violation of that oath
subverted the rule of law. Rehnquist notes Chase's "thoroughly
partisan attitude during parts of the proceedings against John
Callender,"14' his breach of the "obligation . . . to refrain from
ridiculing. . . the lawyers,"150ridicule which Chase directed
solely against counsel for defendant and which inevitably prejudiced the jury. Justice Berkeley was impeached in England
because, inter alia he "did much discourage complainant's coun~ ~ 1 . ~ ~ ~ 5 ~
What Rehnquist justly regards as "most damaging" to
Chase were "incidents that occurred before he ever reached
Richmond to try the case."152These incidents-detailed in the
testimonies of Luther Martin and John Mason before the
Senate-are recounted above,'53 and again by Rehnquist?
They reveal, he acknowledges, "rather clear bias of Chase
against Callender."'55 But he remarks that they "were not reLet us look a t
ferred to in the Articles of Impea~hrnent."'~~
the Articles.
Article I1 alleged that in trying Callender, Chase was
"prompted by a similar spirit of persecution and inj~stice."'~~
"Prompted by a similar spirit of persecution" seems quite clearly to refer to a spirit that antedated the trial. Presumably that
was the Senate's understanding, for it admitted the oral testimony of preexisting bias. Are we t o assume that Chase's galaxy
of counsel and the Senate unthinkingly admitted damaging
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
supra
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 78-86.
supra note 22, at 273. See also supra note 135.
1 WARREN,
supra note 56, at 83.
REHNQUIST,
Id. at 82.
Judiciary

Act, ch. 20,

8, 1 Stat. 76 (1789) (emphasis added). See also

text accompanying note 138.
REHNQUIST,
supra note 56, at 108.
Id. at 84.
3 STATETRIALS1283, 1287-88 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816).
supm note 56, at 86.
REHNQUIST,
Supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
supra note 56, at 86.
REHNQUIST,
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 86.
14 ANNAIS OF CONG.86 (1852).
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evidence of which the pleadings gave no notice? Moreover, that
testimony serves to explain why, as article IV, paragraph 5
charges, Chase's conduct of the trial was marked by "an indecent solicitude . . . for the conviction of the accused."'58 It furnishes the motivation for Chase's "extraordinary" rulings, his
"partisan attitude" throughout the trial. Motivation, if memory
serves me, need not be pleaded. In any event, we are not retrying Chase, but asking, in light of uncontroverted facts, what
should be the verdict of history? In this, we follow in the footsteps of the Court; for, as Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us,
in 1964 the Court opined that the Sedition Act of 1798 "did
violate the First Amendment."'59
Lastly, Rehnquist observes that no law required a "federal
judge to disqualify himself on account of bias."'" That, however, did not absolve Chase from conducting the Callender trial
in impartial fashion?' The Supreme Court declared that "a
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."'" Judicial impartiality, Thomas Hobbes observed, is "a
law of nature."'" Hamilton put it simply: ''[Who would be
willing t o stake his life and estate upon the verdict of a jury
acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his
g ~ i l t . " 'English
~
judges, Justice Story declared, had been impeached "for acting grossly contrary t o the duties of their off i ~ e . " ' For
~ ~ me, as for Blackstone, "tyrannical partiality of
judges" is a "crime of deep malignity."lB6
The impeachment failed narrowly, Presser notes, not for
lack of evidence, but, in great part, because the prosecution
was led by the "ineffective and disorganized" John
Rand~lph.'~'"A worse champion than Randolph for a difficult

158.
159.

Id.
REHNQUIST,
supra note 56, at 89 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376

U.S.254 (1964)).
160. REHNQUIST,
supra note 56, at 87.
161. Rehnquist observes that Chase "should have refrained from making the
statements attributed to him." Id. at 88.
162. In re Murchison, 349 US. 133, 136 (1955). See also supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
163. HOBBES,
supra note 52, at 80.
NO. 65, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added)
164. THE FEDERALIST
(Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). See also supra text accompanying note 52.
165.
1 STORY, supra note 140. See also supra text accompanying note 140.
166. 4 B L A C ~ N Esupm
,
note 53, at 140. See also supm text accompanying
note 53.
167.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 156.
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cause," wrote Henry Adams, "could not be imagined.'y168
Moreover, he had alienated his fellow Republicans by his savage attack on the Administration's compromise of the Yazoo
Indian Territory Land Fraud, "with a ferocity all but insane i n
As a result, enough disaffected Republicans
its violen~e."'~~
voted with the Federalist bloc to block the conviction by a narrow margin. The acquittal, my own detailed study of the impeachment proceedings convinces me, represents a failure of
justice. These facts call for detailed rebuttal; the facts are not
to be dismissed as the views of "Jefferson and his partisans,"
nor as a mere ebullition of Republican politics. It was the Federalists who played politics: "The Federalist senators, sitting a s
jurors, had caucused on their vote against conviction before the
trial began."'70
Where Chase maintained that his acts, though "improper"
were not defined as a crime, Presser urges that they "violated
no law."17' Since he follows in Chase's footsteps, inferably
Presser too insists that, lacking a n indictable crime, there is no
basis for impeachment. The historical sources to the contrary
are marshalled e l s e ~ h e r e . "Here
~
it must suflCice to note that
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides t h a t
"Ljludgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office . . . but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment ."'73 "Removal from ofice" is customarily not regarded as "punishment" for a crime; punishment is
generally limited to fines and imprisonment. Moreover, "punishment" is made the subject of a separate, undeniable criminal
proceeding. If, therefore, removal be regarded as criminal, it
would run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's ban of double jeopardy. Then too, since there is no federal common law of
cri~nes,"~the impeachment provision, as Justice Story pointed out, would be a "nullity" until Congress specified what cona

168. 2 ADAMS,supra note 60, at 151.
supra note 44, at 174. Randolph's acts "in connection with
169. 3 BEVERIDGE,
the settlement of the Yazoo [Indian Land] Fraud claims had antagonized a considsupm note 56, at
erable number of the members of his own party." REHNQUIST,
110. For a discussion regarding Randolph's actions in connection with the Yazoo
supra note. 44, at 575-79.
fraud, see 3 BEVERIDGE,
170. BOWERS, supm note 36, at 280.
171. Presser, supra note 4, at 1489; see also supm text accompanying note 135.
172. See Berger, supm note 141, at 53-102.
173. U.S. CONST.art. I, $ 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
174.
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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stitutes impeachable conduct.'75 No Congress has essayed t o
define or codify impeachable acts. In employing the English
terms "high crimes and misdemeanors," the Framers adopted
the meaning given to them by English practice.'76
IV. THEMIDNIGHT
JUDGES
Presser asserts that Berger is "himself consumed by partisanship when he attempts to defend the Jeffersonian sacking of
the 'midnight judges.' "'17 After being overwhelmingly swept
from office by the Jeffersonian victors in 1800, the lame-duck
Federalist-dominated Congress.created twenty-odd judgeships,
and "[alt the last hour," Adams "appointed sixteen Federalists
to the new circuit [court] judgeship^."'^^ Let a respected historian, Merrill Peterson, hopefully not "consumed by partisanship," describe the events:
On March 3 the Senate was in session late into the night
confirming a last batch of nominations, and Adams spent his
final hours in the executive chair hurriedly signing nocturnal
commissions. The indecency of the proceeding capped two
crowded months of Federalist office-packing. What was this
for unless to stack the cards against the new regime?'"

Presser blandly replies, "there is nothing untoward about
appointing judges whenever the President has a vacancy t o
fill."180But here, numerous "vacancies'' were created at the
last minute to saddle Federalist judges on the incoming administration. Presser recognizes that "most American historians"
regard the Judiciary Act of 1801
as a blatant attempt to entrench the Federalists on the bench
before Adams's term ended, thus to secure the one branch of
the national government not yet lost to the Federalists. This
175.
1 STORY, supra note 140, 8 798.
176.
Since "high crimes and misdemeanors* are not defined by a federal statute,
said Story, resort "must be had either to parliamentary practice and the common
law . . . or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of the Senate." 1 STORY,supra note 140, @ 796, 798. See also United States v. Smith, 18
US. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820).
177.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1484.
OF THE AMERI178.
Leonard W.Levy, Jzdiciary Act of 1801, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
CAN CONSTITUTION
1077 (1986).
179.
PETERSON,
supra note 28, at 668. The proceedings were "a blatantly partisan measure designed, in part, to make the judiciary a fortress against the rising
Republicanism of the nation." Id. a t 631.
180.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1484.
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motive on the part of the Federalists seems clear, but often
lost sight of is the fact that the Federalists were equally motivated by the need to create several badly needed reforms in
the judiciary which would have made the delivery of federal
justice more comprehensive and more c~nvenient.'~' .

"Needed reforms" was merely a facade for the "stacked
Understandably, Jefferson moved to repeal the Judiciary
Act which created the judgeships. Presser labels the repeal as
blatantly "uncon~titutional."~'~
The power of one legislature
t o repeal an Act of its predecessors is rooted in the common
law? Furthermore, Article I11 of the Constitution gives Congress power to establish inferior courts;'" the power to establish carries with it the power to abolish. Against this, Presser
urges that judges may be removed from office only by impeachment.'86 But the right to tenure cannot limit Congress's power to disestablish a court. Tenure was not designed to compel
continuance of a useless court until the death of the incumbent.
A judge may have a right to continuance of salary but not to
the performance of functions no longer needed. This is not a
case-Presser's horrible example-of a congressional attempt to
circumvent the impeachment process by abolishing the office of
a particular judge,''? but an honest effort to undo a flagrant

181.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 5. "Gouverneur Morris explained that the act was
necessary because the Federalists were 'about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind; can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship
supra note 56, at 50 (quoting RICHARDE. ELLIS,
through the storm.' " REHNQUIST,
CRISIS: COURTSAND POLITICSIN THE YOUNGREPUBLIC15
THE JEFFERSONIAN
(1971)).
182. The Republicans "regarded it, with considerable justification, as a piece of politsupra note 56, a t 50. "The Sedition Act of 1798 was
ical chicanery." REHNQUIST,
rightly thought by the Jeffersonians to have been used on occasion as a means of
silencing hostile criticism of the administration by the opposition press." Id. a t 27576.
Merrill Peterson considers that "the figures showed clearly that the dockets
were not so crowded as to warrant an expensive addition to the system." PETERSON, supra note 28, a t 696. The Federalist Wolcott let the cat out of the bag:
"there is no way to combat the state opposition but by an efficient and extended
organization of judges, magistrates, and other civil officers." Id. a t 631.
183.
Presser, supra note 1, at 157. In 1803, the "Supreme Court-consisting entirely of Federalist appointees-upheld
the constitutionality of the repeal[er]."
supra note 56, at 52.
REHNQUIST,
184. See Presser, supra note 4, a t 1485.
185. U.S.CONST.art. 111, $ 1.
186. Presser, supra note 4, a t 1485-86.
187. Id.
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attempt on a wholesale scale by a defeated party to perpetuate
its control of the judiciary.
Presser recognizes that "Chase could convince no other
Supreme Court Justice to challenge the Jeffersonians on their
Marshall, he
view of the repealability of j udge~hips."'~~
states, failed t o "acknowledge the blatant unconstitutionality of
the Jeffersonian-controlled- federal legislature's repeal of the
1801 Judiciary Act [enacted by a Federalist 'controlled
Congress']," and "to protest against the Jeffersonian's sacking
of the Federalist 'midnight judges.' "I8' To Presser, this appears to be a "shirking of the responsibility for fidelity to the
Constitution on the part of the judiciary."1g0Those Justices
were not, however, "consumed by [Jeffersonian] partisanship";
and it would appear that it is Presser that is the partisan,
seeing "blatant unconstitutionality" which was hidden from the
Justices.

For his views on original intention, Presser relies on Jefferson Powell's "brilliant article"lgl without examining my thorough-going refutation of Powell.'" Powell published his article when he was but three years out of law school. A practiced
historian knows, as Harold Laski wrote to Justice Holmes, that
there is a hierarchy of authority.lg3The studies of a veteran
of sixty years of publication, whom Presser himself describes as
"a renowned scholar,"194are not lightly to be dismissed on the
word of a fledgling. Original intention is at the heart of the
current debate regarding the role of the Supreme Court, so its
188.
Id. a t 1486. Richard Ellis stated that "Chase vigorously campaigned behind
the scenes for the Supreme Court to declare the repeal law unconstitutional, but
the other Justices did not go along with him." Richard Ellis, Samuel Chuse, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
293 (1986). See also Berger, supra
note 2, at 887 n.107.
189.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 163.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. a t 6 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)).
192.
Raoul Berger, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 296 (1986); Raoul Berger, m e Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell,
67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1055-77 (1989).
2 HOLMES-LASKI
L-R~
1463 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). Albert Jay Nock
193.
alludes to the "great peril . . . [of] the inability to appraise and grade one's authorities, the tendency to accept whatever appears on the printed page as authoritative." NOCK, supra note 23, at 287.
194.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1475.
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history deserved Presser's independent canvass. Instead, he
finds that Powell is "correct,"195and dismisses my refutation
because the "legal academy" awards the palm to Powell,'g6 of
which more later.
Although Powell recognizes that the English common
lawyers' references to "intention" often "sounded remarkably
he maintains that they
like contemporary intenti~nalists,"'~~
looked for the intent exclusively in the words themselves-a
confessedly "curious u~age"'~~-thisdespite their constant differentiation between words and intention. Powell is confuted by
the common law. For the benefit of the readers who will not
scurry t o the library t o determine for themselves wherein lies
the truth, let me set forth a few highlights.
(1) The fifteenth century sage, Chief Justice Frowyck, recounted that the judges demanded of the "makers" of the Statute of Westminster (1285) what certain words meaxit, and they
"answered." "And so," he continued, "in our dayes have those
that were the penners & devisors of statutes bene the grettest
lighte for exposicion of statutes."1ss
(2) Lord Chancellor Hatton wrote circa 1587 that "whensoever there is departure from the words to the intent, that must
be well proved that there is such a meaning."200
(3) Matthew Bacon epitomized such precedents in his New
Abridgment: "Everything which is within the Intention of the
Makers of a statute is, although it is not written in the Letter
thereof, as much within the Statute as that which is within the
Letter."201
(4) Samuel Thorne, a leading legal historian, concluded
that "[alctual intent . . . is controlling from Hengham's day to

195. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 243 11.45.
196. Presser, supra note 4, at 1493-94. Reviewing my Government by Judiciary,
Lord Beloff, an Oxford emeritus and long-time student of American constitutional
law, concurred, saying, "The quite extraordinary contortions that have gone into
proving the contrary make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality of
American legal historical scholarship." Max Beloff, Book Review, THE TIMES (London), April 7, 1978, (Higher Education Supplement), at 11.
197. H. Jefferson Powell, 17te Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1987).
198. Id.
199. A DISCOURSE
& UNDERSTANDING
OF STATUTES
151-52
UPONTHE EXPOSICION
(Samuel Thorne ed., 1942) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DISCOURSE].
200.
HAITON,A TREATISECONCERNING
STATUTES OF ACTS OF PARCHRI~OPHER
LIAMENT: AND THE EXPOSIT~ON
THEREOF14-15 (1677) (emphasis added).
201.
4 MAWHEW BACON,A NEWABRIDGMENTOF THE LAW647-48 (3d ed. 1768).
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that of Lord Nottingham [ 1 6 7 8 ] . ' ~ ~ ~
This rule represents sound common sense, reflected in the
statement of John Selden, a preeminent seventeenth-century
scholar: "[A] Man's Writing has but one true sense, which is
that which the Author meant when he writ it."'03 Who can
better explain what was meant than the writer himself? Neither Powell nor Presser comment on these and other similar
materials that were spread before them.
Instead, Presser rests on the "conclusions of the legal academy," citing a recent article by Hans Baade,204which merits
attention if only because it betrays the sorry state of activist
historical endeavors. Baade unearthed a n English copyright
one
case from 1769,'05 wherein one of four judges-in
sentence-rejected recourse to legislative history, this being,
Baade affirms, the rule "first articulated in Millar v.
Taylor,"206thus confirming that prior thereto the common law
was to the contrary. Shortly thereaRer the House of Lords
rejected the copyright views expressed in Millar, without taking notice of Justice Willes' "legislative history" remark.
For his opinion that the Millar view prevailed in the United States, Baade invokes a n assumption of counsel in Wheaton
v. Peters207 that Millar was known to the framer^.^" Certainly the Wheaton court did not assume that Millar was part
of the "corpus of the common law of the United state^.'"'^
The Court stated that "there can be no common law of the
United States," and found that no such copyright doctrine obtained in Pennsylvania, "the state in which the controversy
originat ed.7'210
Baade is not the first to attack my views. Richard Saphire
wrote i n 1983 that refuting Berger "has become somewhat of a
cottage i n d ~ s t r y , ' ~and
" the stream of "refutations" flows un202.
DISCOURSE,supra note 199, a t 126.
203.
OF JOHN
SELDEN,ESQ.
JOHN SELDEN,TABLETALK:BEINGTHE DISCOURSES
10 (2d ed. 1696).
204.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1493 11.94 (citing Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991)).
205.
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
2 .
Baade, supra note 204, a t 1108.
207.
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
208.
Baade, supra note 204, a t 1009.
209.
Id.
210.
Wheaton, 33 US. (8 Pet.) a t 658. All this and much more is documented in
a forthcoming article in the Texas Law Review. Raoul Berger, Original Intent: A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1992).
211.
Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution,
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abated. But the corpse will not stay buried. As Eric Foner
wrote in a similar situation, the fact that "a generation of scholars has directed its energies to overturning" my thesis
Presser, who critiindicates that it is to be taken seri~usly.~"
cizes my resort to a secondary source, who "undoubtedly" succumbed to "Jeffersonian propaganda2'-Samuel Eliot
M ~ r i s o n , ~that
' ~ soft-touch-"uncritically" embraces his own
secondary sources, and what sources-Powell and Baade!
Presser off-handedly refers to "the frequently discredited
idea of turning back the clock,'n14a phrase drawn from Chief
Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Brown u. Board of
~ducation~l~-Warren,
who had no taste for digging in the
library216-and from Paul Brest. Without doubt, Brest attempted to discredit' original intention; he it was who
challenged the "assumption" that judges are "bound by the text
or original understanding of the Constit~tion."~~'
Understandably for him there was no need to turn back the clock t o
impede an imperial judiciary. Marshall, on the other hand, regarded "intention as the most sacred rule of interpretati~n."~l'
The importance of original intention resides in the fact
that ours is a government by consent of the governed, and as
James Iredell said, the people choose "to be governed under
such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed
or promised to submit upon any other."219The postulates are
cogently summarized by Richard Kay:
To implement real limits on government the judges must
have reference to standards that are external to, and prior to,
8 U. DAYTONL. REV. 745, 753 (1983).
212.
Eric Foner, The Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1982,
8 7 a t 27.
213.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1481.
214.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 168.
215.
347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
216.
Fred Rodell of Yale rejoiced that Warren was not a "look-it-up-in-the-library" intellectual in his "off-hand dismissal of legal and historical research." Fred
Rodell, It Is the Warren Court, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1966, 8 6 (Magazine) a t 30.
Warren preferred his Einsteinean formula: "Is it Fair?" See id.
217.
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204, 224 (1980) (emphasis added). See Raoul Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for
a n Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981).
JOHN MARSHALL, DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCHV. MARYLAND167 (Gerald
218.
Gunther ed., 1969).
OF JAMES
IREDELL146 (Griffith J. McRee ed.,
219.
2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
1858).

586

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSI'IY LAW REVIEW [I992

the matter to be decided. This is necessarily historical investigation. The content of those standards are set at their inception. Recourse to the intention of the framers in judicial review, therefore, can be understood as indispensable to realizing the idea of government limited by law.220

Lastly, the Founders adopted the Constitution on the basis
of representations that its words did not entail certain feared
consequences; they voted for the text as explained to obviate
those fears. To repudiate such representations, said Justice
Story in similar context, would constitute a fraud upon the
people.221

A. Calder v. Bull
Apparently, Presser attaches considerable importance to
Chase's statement made in one of four seriatim opinions in
1 strong
: ~ ~statement that there were cerCalder v. ~ ~ 1"[A]
tain unwritten 'vital' or 'fundamental' principles which circumscribed the activities of both state and federal legislature^."^^
These "supraconstitutiona1 principles"224sounded like "natural law" jurisprudence.225They were immediately rejected by
Justice Iredell: "[Tlhe Court cannot pronounce [an Act] to be
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the
principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are
regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men
have differed upon the
More importantly, the Constitution itself provides that it
"shall be the supreme law of the land"; it leaves no room for a
supersupreme law. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in
Marbury u. m ad is on:'^ a written Constitution was designed
to define and limit the delegated powers.228 That signdies,

220.
Richard Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN.L. REV.801, 805-06 (1978).
221.
"If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated . . .
that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole
people to give a different construction to its powers?" 1 STO*, supra note 140,
8 1084.
222.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
223.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 87.
Id. at 42.
224.
Id. at 88.
225.
226.
Calder,3 U.S. at 399.
227.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
228.
Id. at 176.
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Philip Kurland points out, that "government is the creature of
the Constitution and cannot do what it does not authorize."229
Such considerations applied with special force to judges, for
Americans had a "profound fear of judicial di~cretion,'"~'
which was intensified by the Puritans' fear of judicial warping
of the law by "twisted constr~ction."~~'
When called upon to adopt a federal common law of crimes
, ~ ~ ~ declared, "the constituin United States u. W ~ r r a l l Chase
tion of the Union is the source of all the jurisdiction of the
national government; so that the departments of the government can never assume any power, that is not expressly granted
by that instrument."233Although Calder appears to be incon~ ~ ~ finds a "similarity in the
sistent with W ~ r r a l l ,Presser
principles" of these cases. In Worrall "respect for individual
rights required" that the crime be first defined, while Calder
asserted by way of illustration, that "no legislature could pass
[an] ex post facto law[]" and the like.235That is Presser's fine
distinction;236but throughout, Worrall emphasized the judicial lack of authority to draw jurisdiction outside the Constitut i ~ nBefore
. ~ ~ long
~ the Supreme Court in United States u. Hud229.
PHILIP KURLAND,WATERGATE
AND THE CONSTITU!~ION7 (1978). Presser
recounts that in 1804, Chase himself declared that "the judge [has] as his simple
task the declaration of the law as it has been given to him in a written constitution or statute." PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 185.
GORDONWOOD,THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC1776-1787, a t
230.
298 (1969).
231.
See Berger, supra note 2, at 892-93.
232.
28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766).
233.
Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
See Presser, supra note 4, at 1480. This is viewed by Presser as illustrative
234.
"of the complexity and multileveled nature of early American federal jurisprudence." PRESSER,supra note 3, at 177. He explains that Chase et al. drew from
"complex and competing ideologies" which "often led them to take inconsistent
political or legal positions." Id. at 45. This is a n elegant way of saying that he
played both sides of the street, choosing conflicting doctrines as suited the occasion.
235.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1480. This was gratuitous because Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "no ex post facto law shall be
. I, 5 10, cl. 1.
passed." See also U.S. C o ~ s r art
236.
Referring to a "sophisticated argument," Presser opines that it is "difficult
to believe that such a refined analysis would have appealed to many late eighteenth century minds." PRESSER,supra note 3, at 88. See also id. at 218 11.41, 219
11.61.
237.
In Worrall, Chase stated, "[A111 the judicial authority of the federal courts,
must be derived, either from the constitution of the United States, or from the
acts of congress made in pursuance of that constitution." 28 F. Cas. at 776. And
he said, "[C]ommon law authority, relating to crime and punishments, has not been
conferred upon the government of the United States, which is a government in
other respects also of a limited jurisdiction." Id. a t 779.
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son & G ~ o d w i n ~rejected
~'
common law crimes and confirmed
that when the operations of a court are "confined to certain
specific objects," it may not assume a 'huch more extended" jurisdiction "applicable to a great variety of subjects."239The fact is
that Chase "switch[ed] back and forth," from natural law to
instrumentalism, regarding "styles of judicial reasoning [as]
simply political tools.'"40
For his view that the law of nature was incorporated in
American law, Presser avouches James Wilson who, starting
with the proposition that the law of nations was part of American law, concluded that "[tlhe law of nations was 'the law of
nature.' 'a41 By that logic, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 limits access t o the "law of nature"; it authorizes Congress "[tlo define . . . Offences against the Law of Nations."242The genesis
of this provision is instructive. Initially it was proposed to confer jurisdiction on the Court in cases concerning the law of nat i o n ~ This
. ~ ~ unrestricted
~
grant was changed so that Congress could "declare the Law and Punishment . . . of Offences
against the Law of nation^."^^ Madison observed that "no
foreign law should be a standard farther than is expressly
adopted."245Ultimately, Congress was empowered to "define"
such offenses.246Gouverneur Morris explained that this was
necessary because "the law of [nations] [was] often too vague
and deficient to be a rule."247
Therefore, unless Congress defines such offences against
the law of nations to include the law of nature, natural law has
no application in that context. And unless an offense against
the law of nations is involved, Congress, by necessary implication, has no authority to legislate in the premises.

B. Deference and Democracy
No doubt "the excesses of the French Revolution convinced
Chase and his fellows that democracy had to be tempered with

11 U.S.(7 Cranch) 32 (1812).

Id. at 33.
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 166.
Id. at 71.
U.S. CONST.art. I, 5 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
supra note 36, at 136.
2 RECORDS,
at 168.
at 316.
at 570, 614.
at 615.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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legislative, judicial and constitutional restraint^."^" But the
issues are whether the Framers contemplated the restraints
and whether the Constitution authorized judges to fashion
them. Chase was sailing in the teeth of a democratic storm that
before long blew the Federalists out of office. He was, I earlier
wrote, "utterly insensitive t o the democratic tide that was lapping at his feet even as he labored."24gIt is no answer that he
had, in his "personal odyssey," arrived at "a mature set of beliefs based on English conservative political and judicial princip l e ~ , ' 'including
~~~
belief in "a structured society, the inevitability of different social classes, and the subordination of the
After casting their votes, the
lower orders to the
people, "according to the Federalist judges[,] . . . were henceforth to refrain from harmful criticism of their properly constituted officials and were to obey them unq~estioningly.'"~~
Such notions were completely out of tune with the nascent
democratic forces, who had before them the Founders' harsh
criticisms of George 111.
Consider Chase's charge t o a Baltimore jury, criticizing the
change in the Maryland Constitution extending suffrage as
signifying that "our republican constitution will sink into a
mobocracy."2s3He animadverted upon the "late[r] reformers' "
doctrine that all men "are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and
equal rights" as a "mighty mi~chief,"~"never mind the affwmation in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are
created equal."2ss Presser cites Wilson's alleged belief in a

248.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 179 11.13.
Berger, supra note 2, a t 876, quoted in Presser, supra note 4, a t 1479.
249.
250.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1479.
PRESSER,supra note 3, at 18. The English conservatives' "world of defer251.
ence" contemplated "hierarchical control, and a single set of correct answers to
political problems . . . to be elaborated and pronounced from top down. Sovereignty
in England . . . rested not in the people but in the 'holy trinity' of crown, lords,
and commons." Id. at 51. Those views were shared by Alexander Hamilton, who
stated in the Federal Convention that communities are divided into "the rich and
well born, the other the mass of the people. . . . Nothing but a permanent body
can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable disposition requires checks." 1 RECORDS,supra note 36, a t 299. John Jay forthrightly declared that "those who own the country should govern the country." NOCK, supra
note 23, a t 216. Small wonder that Americans were attracted rather by the views
of English "radical intellectuals." WOOD,supra note 230, a t 15.
252.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 17.
253.
BOWERS,supra note 36, a t 274.
Id.
254.
255.
THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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"limited
but it was not embraced by Chase's
own state, Maryland. Wilson wrote:
This darling privilege of freemen should certainly be extended
a s far as considerations of safety and order will possibly permit. The correct theory and the true principles of safety require, that every citizen whose circumstances do not render
him necessarily dependent on the will of another [e.g. a slave]
should possess a vote.257

I n the Federal Convention Pierce Butler said, "[tlhere is no
right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage."258He was joined by others.259
Chase's idea of "enlightened judicial leadership," says
Presser, led him "to. seek to implement restrictions on legislatures through the 'supra-constitutional principles' found in
Calder u. ~u1Z"~~~-principles
that ran counter to the limited
delegations of the Constitution. As Wilson flatly stated in the
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "the supreme power . . .
resides in the PEOPLE . . . they can distribute it" as they
They did not empower judges to insulate themselves
from criticism or to apply "supra-constitutional principles."
Those in whom the "supreme power resides" have no need to
defer to agents to whom they delegated limited power. And as I
earlier wrote, "The very idea of 'deference' . . . was repugnant
~ ~was
~ to escape from such
to . . . self-reliant A m e r i ~ a n [ s ] . "It
class-ridden notions that they braved the ocean.

VI. THOMASJEFFERSON
Presser charges that Jefferson was a "demagogue," which
his dictionary defmes as a "leader who obtains power by means
of impassioned appeals to the emotions and prejudices of the
p ~ p u l a c e . "The
~ ~ Oxford English Dictionary adds "an unprin256.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1479 n.10.
257.
1 WORKSOF JAMES
WILSON,supra note 84, a t 406-07.
258.
supra note 36, at .202.
RECORDS,
259.
Id. a t 201-03. Jefferson's "unhesitating advocacy of a broadly [based] popular suffrage and of equal representation of the people in the legislature held the
promise of making his constitution a vital instrument of democratic government."
PETERSON,supra note 28, at 105-06.
260.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1479.
261.
PENNSYLVANIAHISF. SOC'Y, PENNSYLVANIA
AND THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION,
1787-1788, a t 316 (John B. McMaster & Fredrick D. Stone eds., 1888).
262.
Berger, supra note 2, a t 874.
263.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1490 11.76 (quoting THE AMERICANHERITAGE
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cipled or factious popular orator."2* Since oratory is the medium of demagogy, and since Jefferson was no o r a t 0 3 ~and
~
delivered no orations, Presser is driven to argue that the "impassioned appeals" were made by proxy, by "partisan scribblers.'"" All credit to Presser for suggesting demagogy by
proxy. Federalist "scribblers" waged a massive campaign of
~ilification,~~'
so by Presser's test, the Federalists were a party of demagogues.
Whatever Adams' reaction in the heat of political
strife,268 his mature judgment expressed in his old age to
Jefferson was, "your administration will be quoted by philoso-

DICTIONARY
379 (2d College ed. 1985)). Presser invokes Justice Story's charge that
Jefferson was a demagogue, "the evil-minded genius behind the spreading disinteMCCLELLAN,
JOSEPH
gration of the country." Id. a t 1489 11.72 (quoting JAMES
STORYAND THE AMERICANCONSTITUTION
119 (1971)). Powell, whose authority
Presser prefers to mine, wrote that according to the consensus, Story was "an
opponent of 'democracy' intent on frustrating the results of the political process" by
"the creation of a body of 'anti-majoritarian' constitutional law." H. Jefferson
Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94
YALE L.J. 1285, 1287 (1985). Story's Commentaries, Powell observes, "were a
massive self-vindication . . . as well as a n indictment of the man Story personally
despisedn-Thomas Jefferson. Id. a t 1300 n.103.
Jefferson " s h u ~ e dpopularity," and was "self-effacing." PETERSON, supra note
28, a t 334. Abigail Adams, who along with John, had long enjoyed close friendship
with Jefferson, wrote, "He is one of the choice ones of the earth." Id. at 302.
Another long-time friend, Lafayette, who was in close contad with him during his
five-year stay in France, wrote to a friend in America, "He is everything that is
good, upright, enlightened and clever, and is respected and beloved by every one
that knows him." Id. at 316. The very antithesis of a "crafty politician." John
Quincy Adams, who came into Congress in 1803, said, "You can never be an hour
in this man's company without something of the marvelous." Id. a t 727. "Lincoln
was unstinting in his admiration for Jefferson." GARRYWILLS, LINCOLN
AT GETTYSBURG 85 (1992).
3 OXFORD ENGLISHDICTIONARY
1727 (1969).
264.
265.
PETERSON,supra note 28, at 655. Peterson noted his "deficiencies a s a
speaker." Id. at 21. In fad, Jefferson "shrank from the impassioned political
bitterness that raged around him." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
992 (14th ed.
1929). He "was not, in his nature, born for the public . . . . He held back, begrudging commitment to the public role." PETERSON,supra note 28, at 30. I n 1792,
"Jefferson found himself brought forward-less
by his friends than by his
enemies-as the 'generalissimo' of a political party on which he meant to mount
his own ambition a t the hazard of government itself . . . . It was not a role he
coveted." Id. a t 466. He "became a candidate for the presidency . . . in spite of
himself. He did not seek the office but the office sought him." Id. a t 543; see also
id. at 552. In the election of 1796, he wrote Madison that "should [Jefferson] and
Adams end in a tie, he wished the chance to go to the New Englander." Id. a t
557. See also NOCK, supra note 23, a t 261.
266.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1490 n.74.
267.
PADOVER,
supra note 23, a t 116, 143; see also supra note 23.
268.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1490 11.74.
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phers as a model of profound wisdom."269That is not the earmark of demagogy. Presser's view of Jefferson as a demagogue,
i.e. "unprincipled," is not shared by American historians. "The
secret of his power," Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, "lay in the
fact that he appealed to and expressed America's idealism,
simplicity, and hopeful outlook,"270a far remove from demagogy. I t is needless to recapitulate the documented particulars of my defense of Jefferson against Presser's charges.271
One who studies those materials is unlikely to conclude that
Jefferson was "committed to a philosophy that the end justifies
the means [e.g. the Louisiana Purchase]," or that he often "ignor[ed] . . . the rule of law,"272whereas Chase "put the rule of
law a t the center of his politics," this of the "American
Jeffreys."273 Presser's comparison of Jefferson's "departure
e.g. the Louisiana Purchase, which Congress
from the
all but forced on him,275with Richard Nixon's coverup of the
Watergate break-in, speaks for itself.276Nor did I "praise Jeffer-

2 PAGESMITH,JOHN
ADAMS 1111 (1962). Adams said, "Mr. Jefferson and I
269.
have grown old and retired from public life. So we are upon our ancient terms of
good will." Id. at 1113.
MORISON,supra note 38, a t 359. "Jefferson, because he had a thorough
270.
trust and confidence in the people, became the idol of American democracy." 12
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BR~ANNICA
989 (14th ed. 1929).
271.
Berger, supra note 2, a t 892-902.
272.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1492.
273.
Id.
274.
Id.
275.
Berger, supra note 2, at 895-96. Madison later wrote, "The public interest,
the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits." PETERSON,
supra note 28, a t 280. Rehnquist recounts:
At first Jefferson himself drew up drafts of an amendment to the Constitution which would authorize the acquisition of Louisiana, but then
word came . . . that Napoleon was having seller's remorse about the
transaction and would seize upon any reason to avoid it. Jefferson then
urged his supporters in Congress to ratify the purchase.
supra note 56, at 56.
REHNQUIST,
276.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1492. Another far-fetched Presser analogy takes
off from Jefferson's comment after the 1792 "massacres" in France: "For such a
cause, Jefferson explained, 'Iwould have seen half the earth desolated.' " PRESSER,
supra note 3, at 153. This, Presser remarks, "strangely foreshadows the attitude of
the American troops in South Vietnam, who piously destroyed villages in order to
'save' them from the Viet Cong." Id. In Vietnam, the troops were invaders seeking
to stifle a native democratic movement. In France, wrote Leonard Woolf, the
Revolution "destroyed an ancient, malignant growth in European society, and this
was essential for the future of European civilization." LEONARD
WOOLF,BEGINNING
AGAIN 215 (1964). The executions, a deplorable concomitant of revolutions, were a
reaction to centuries of feudal oppression whereby the people meant to cast off the
shackles of a despotic regime. Jefferson's sympathy with a suffering people's

SAMUEL CHASE
son for his extra-legal actions,"277which he himself sought to
explain. To wrest from Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia "a contempt for the common man" collides with the facts.278
Nor did Chase and Jefferson have "in common . . . their beliefs
in the need for some deference [i.e., subservience] in society.'7279
To the contrary, Jefferson had "faith in the wisdom of

struggle, even when excessive, is not to be equated with the conduct of a soldiery
ordered to impose the views of a misguided administration upon the Vietnamese.
277.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1492. Typical is Presser's renewed charge that
Jefferson approved the "extra-legal means of apprehending Burr." Id. at 1491.
Jefferson explained why General Wilkinson was justified in (1) "seizing [the]
notorious conspirators," and (2) "sending them to the seat of government, when the
written law gave them a right to trial in the territory." Berger, supra note 2, at
897. This, Jefferson explained, was due to "[tlhe danger of their rescue, of their
continuing machinations . . . . [Slalvation of the city, and of the Union itself . . .
constituted a law of necessity and self preservation." WRITINGSOF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 1232-33 (Viking Press 1984) (1895-99). Contained in a private letter to a
correspondent, it recalls Lincoln's later suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland
because of the secessionists' threat to Washington. Such judgments have to be
made on the scene. Poindexter, sent by Jefferson to report, proposed that Burr be
sent to Washington so that the Supreme Court could determine the place of trial.
BOWERS,supra note 36, at 393. In the circumstances, Jefferson's conduct did not
display arbitrary disregard for the rule of law.
278.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1490. His arguments are discussed in Berger,
supra note 2, at 898-901.
Presser builds on Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, published in 1785.
supra note 28, at 153. There Jefferson, viewing vast pools of ignorance,
PETERSON,
proposed a sweeping educational program: three years of free schooling at the
elementary level, followed by education at State expense of gifted people selected
through a winnowing process. The fact that the well-to-do could continue their
education at their own expense does not indicate that Jefferson was committed to
keeping the common man in his place. The States were in dire financial straits
and could not undertake free education at all levels.
In truth, Jefferson "knew absolutely no social distinctions," and had "an unlimited faith in the honesty of the people; a large faith in their common sense." 12
ENCYCLOPEDLA
BRITANNICA
991 (14th ed. 1929). He believed that talent was "scatsupra note 28, at
tered with equal hand through all" conditions of men. PE~ERSON,
114. In short, he believed in training a meritocracy drawn from all walks of life.
While serving as minister to France, Jefferson concluded that the "immense majority was in bondage to its masters." NOCK, supra note 23, at 88.
His hatred of exploitation of the poor by the rich was unremitting. See PETERSON, supra note 28, at 382, 350; Berger, supra note 2, at 899-900. At a time when
suffrage was tied to property, he urged manhood suffrage. PETERSON, supra note
28, at 282.
279.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1492. Throughout, Jefferson's sympathies were
with the common man. Thus, he rejected Hamilton's schemes for funded debt and
bank stock because they "would further enrich the privileged financial class a t the
expense of the mass of people." PM'ERsoN, supra note 28, at 460. "The aristocracy
of England," Jefferson observed, "have the laws and government in their hands
[and] have so managed them as to reduce the eleemosynary class or paupers,
below the means of supporting life, even by labour." NOCK,supra note 23, at 104.
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the masses";280 he advocated "the control of the people
over. . . their government," and considered that the "mass of
the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights."281
Presser notes Jefferson's "faith in public opinion and in democracy generally," being "poles apart from Chase."282This does
not smack of "contempt for the common man."
A word too about Presser's view that "Jefferson's notion of
states' rights was . . . constitutionally untenable" and "ultimately led to our civil war.'a8s Presser refers to the Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions, which, like a too tightly coiled spring,
recoiled from the "odious" Alien and Sedition Acts. And as the
Encyclopedia Britannica remarks, "They are not to be judged
by constitutional principles established later by courts and
war."2" Lastly, the Britannica concludes that "the ideas [Jefferson] advocated have become the very foundation of American
Republicanism. No other man's ideas have had anything like
a n equal influence upon the institutions of the country,'7285
least of all Chase's. This is the answer to the issue Presser
framed: "whether Jefferson or Chase better expressed noble
ideals fit for American j u r i s p r ~ d e n c e . " ~ ~ ~

VII. CONCLUSION
Presser "confess[es] to a degree of naivete and a romantic
streak" in cherishing the ideal that "ours is a government of
laws, not of men."" One need not be a Don Quixote to share
that belief; law is indispensable to the maintenance of society.
But a "bigoted Federalist bully"-so Chase is regarded by "every other legal historian"-is hardly the happiest exemplar of
the reign of law. Even a Sancho Panza can perceive that the
bully on the block is not the law's beau ideal. Presser's "project
of making a noble stand for the rule of law . . . through reliance
280.
PRESSER,supra note 3, a t 161.
281.
JEFFERSON,1394-95 (Viking Press 1984) (1895-99). He
WRITINGSOF THOMAS
preferred the "majority opinion of the community" to that "of self-styled guardians
supra note 28, a t 703.
of the public interest." PETERSON,
282.
PRESSER, supra note 3, a t 154.
283.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1491-92.
284.
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
989 (14th ed. 1929). In 1803, some leading
New England Federalists conspired to secede fmm the Union on the ground that
the Louisiana Purchase absolved the original states from their allegiance. MORISON,
supra note 38, a t 368.
285.
BRITANNICA
989 (14th ed. 1929).
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
286.
Presser, supra note 4, a t 1490.
287.
Id. at 1477.
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is bizarre. It
on Samuel Chase, the 'American Jeffreys,'
recalls an early German film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari,
which had no horizontal or perpendicular lines; all were slanted in different directions, creating a disquieting disorientation.
Nor did Chase "articulate and activate the moral aspirations of the American people,"289then or now. His attachment
t o conservative English principles of deference and subservience were at odds with the American commitment to the tenet
"all men are created
Presser failed to read deferential principles into the minds of the Founders, still less supervening "supra-constitutional principles of government."
Lastly, I dissent from the implications of his final remarks
that we "argue[d] like lawyers . . . about who was 'right,' " and
that "good lawyers do not necessarily make good historia n ~ . " ~It~little
'
matters whether Presser or Berger is "right,"
but it is the duty of a scholar to vindicate the truth.
Nor am I prepared t o admit that "good lawyers do not
necessarily make good historians." Lawyers, to be sure, must
espouse their client's cause, but they may not therefore impose
upon the
A lawyer is an officer of the court, under a
duty of scrupulous candor. One who distorts or conceals the
facts invites disaster and sows distrust in the minds of the
judge. Like the historian, therefore, the lawyer had best recount the facts honestly. Two eminent practitioners of the historical art, Hugh Trevor-Roper and C.R. Elton, agreed that the
essence of "historical method" is to ground "detail upon evidence and generalizations upon details."293That is the meth-

288.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1477.
289.
290.
It was English radicalism, not conservative "deferential" thinking that won
American hearts. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 52, 207 n.31. See also WOOD,
supra
note 230, at 16-17.
291.
Presser, supra note 4, at 1495.
292.
"Like Berger," writes Presser, "I too have in me some unstoppable
cussedness, some irresistible desire to fly against conventional wisdom." Id. at
1478. "Speak for yourself, John." Sheer intellectual curiosity, not an "irresistible
desire to fly against conventional wisdom," has launched me on my studies of
impeachment, the fourteenth amendment, and federalism, etc. And I have ever
bowed to the fads, however unpalatable the result. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV.602 (1942).
Presser charged that I am "consumed by partisanship," Presser, supra note 4,
at 1478, but he would be hard-pressed to finger the "partisan" source of my Chase
studies.
293.
Hugh Trevor-Roper, Book Review of Elton, The Practice of History, THE
TIMES(London), Oct. 15, 1967, at 33.
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od both good lawyers and good historians employ-they draw
rational conclusions from meticulously screened facts. Each
must guard against imposing a theory upon recalcitrant facts;
for each, Procrustes is a poor model.

